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Oil has become a single global market in which oil price fluctuations now
have the ability to rock the world economy. The purpose of this thesis is to
examine the changing nature of this threat and by doing so, show that Saudi
Arabia, which has acted as the primary stabilizing tool by American foreign
policy makers, will no longer suffice in this capacity. Rather, Saudi Arabia,
which has for the most part cooperated with the United States in helping to
stabilize oil price and supply disruptions, will become increasingly less
cooperative in a much shorter time frame than might be anticipated with
regard to oil supplies. This thesis proposes possible avenues for U.S. national
security policy by exploring pathways that might further ensure economic
security and stability of the Middle East region in light of the new nature of
the oil threat. The goal of economic security and stability can only be realized
through an understanding of the oil producing nations and their relationships
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
With the end of the cold war, the dawn of a new era is upon us. This era
brings with it much new thinking with regard to global military and political
strategies. New factors are present in the equation that will give rise to the
"new world order." One of the unfortunate highlights in the opening chapter
of this new era was the Persian Gulf War. This war illustrated one of these new
factors ushered with this new era of rethinking global strategies and that
factor is economic power, and in the case of the Persian Gulf War specifically,
the economic power of oil.
We are seeing a shift in thinking among world powers which is begin-
ning to de-emphasize geo-strategic concepts of military power and show
greater emphasis toward geo-economic power. As this shift takes place it will
become apparent that oil will play an increasingly important role in the
United States' goal of economic and national security. Thus, it follows that the
control of oil presents an increasingly vulnerable area of U.S. national
security and a potential threat if that control were to fall into the wrong
hands. Although the U.S. has made efforts to diversify its oil resources and find
alternative energy sources, the more subtle but much farther reaching effects
have not been due to a shortage of oil supplies, but rather the economic effects
that accompany fluctuations in oil supplies. Fluctuating oil prices that have
accompanied severe supply disruptions have exacerbated the United States'
most recent recessions as well as the country's current economic downturn.
Indeed, oil price fluctuations now have the ability to rock the world market.
v
What current plans fail to address is the very essence of U.S. security
interests in the region, and that may no longer be oil, but rather the world
wide economic impact of oil supply disruptions. This aspect of U.S. interest in
the Middle East is not a very clear one to the average American. Economic
interests do not seem important enough to risk American lives over, nor do
many Americans seem to support the idea of going to war for oil. In fact, how-
ever, oil has become a critical feature of the global economy. In theory, if any
one entity controls too much oil, it can control the supply, the price, and the
economic and military power that comes with it. This is the less revealed threat
to U.S. national security.
This thesis examines the changing nature of this threat and by doing so,
attempts to show that Saudi Arabia, which has acted as the primary stabilizing
tool by American foreign policy makers, will no longer suffice in this
capacity. Rather, Saudi Arabia, which has for the most part cooperated with
the United States in helping to stabilize oil price and supply disruptions, will
become increasingly less cooperative in a much shorter time frame than
might be anticipated with regard to oil supplies. This thesis proposes possible
avenues for U.S. national security policy by exploring pathways that might
further ensure economic security and stability of the Middle East region in
light of the new nature of the oil threat. The goal of economic security and
stability can only be realized through an understanding of the oil producing




With the end of the cold war, the dawn of a new era is upon us. This era
brings with it much new thinking with regard to global military and political
strategies. New factors are present in the equation that will give rise to the
"new world order." One of the unfortunate highlights in the opening chapter
of this new era was the Persian Gulf War. This war illustrated one of these
new factors ushered with this new era of rethinking global strategies and
that factor is economic power, and in the case of the Persian GulfWar specifi-
cally, the economic power of oil.
We are seeing a shift in thinking among world powers which is begin-
ning to de-emphasize geo-strategic concepts of military power and show
greater emphasis toward geo-economic power. As this shift takes place it will
become apparent that oil will play an increasingly important role in the
United States' goal of economic and national security. Thus, it follows that
the control of oil presents an increasingly vulnerable area of U.S. national
security and a potential threat if that control were to fall into the wrong
hands.
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August of 1990 and the crisis in the
Middle East has brought into sharp focus America's continued dependence on
foreign oil imports. This is the third reminder in the last two decades of
America's vulnerability to oil supply disruptions. Although the U.S. has made
efforts to diversify its oil resources and find alternative energy sources, the
more subtle but much farther reaching effects have not been due to a
shortage of oil supplies, but rather the economic effects that accompany
fluctuations in oil supplies. Fluctuating oil prices that have accompanied
severe supply disruptions have exacerbated the United State's most recent
recessions as well as the country's current economic downturn. 1 Indeed, oil
price fluctuations now have the ability to rock the world market.
It is for this reason that Persian Gulf security polices will again come to
the forefront of U.S. national interests and present new challenges. In the
wake of the Persian Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, analysts
and strategists have scrambled to assemble a Persian Gulf/Middle East secu-
rity posture to meet the needs of the new world order. From increased naval
presence to the pre-positioning of troops and equipment in the region, mili-
tary security proposals have been planned to the most minute detail to meet
every possible military contingency. Military strategists are now emphasizing
the ability to adapt to different scenarios such as regional conflicts and
littoral warfare. What these plans fail to address, however, is the very
essence of U.S. security interests in the region, and that may no longer be oil,
but rather the world wide economic impact of oil supply disruptions. This
aspect of U.S. interest in the Middle East is not a very clear one to the aver-
age American. Economic interests do not seem important enough to risk
American lives over, nor do many Americans seem to support the idea of
going to war for oil. The only way to gain popular support for military inter-
vention in these areas, it seems, is to couch it in the language of deterring
aggression and fostering a stable post-cold war world order.
iphil Kuntz, "Unstable Mideast Oil Supply Rocks the World Market", Congressional Quarterly, 5
January 1991, 21.
In fact, however, oil has become a critical feature of the global economy.
In theory, if any one entity controls too much oil, it can control the supply, the
price, and the economic and military power that comes with it.2 This is the
less revealed threat to U.S. national security.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the changing nature of this
threat and by doing so, show that Saudi Arabia, which has acted as the
primary stabilizing tool by American foreign policy makers, will no longer
suffice in this capacity. Rather, Saudi Arabia, which has for the most part
cooperated with the United States in helping to stabilize oil price and supply
disruptions, will become increasingly less cooperative in a much shorter time
frame than might be anticipated with regard to oil supplies. This thesis will
propose possible avenues for U.S. national security policy by exploring path-
ways that might further ensure economic security and stability of the Middle
East region in light of the new nature of the oil threat. The goal of economic
security and stability can only be realized through an understanding of the oil
producing nations and their relationships with the international community
and world economy.
2Kuntz, Congressional Quarterly, 21.
II. THE ROLE OF OIL IN DEFINING U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS
A. OIL CONSUMPTION FACTS
Before turning to the economics and politics of oil, the geographic distri-
bution and features of oil bear examination. The Middle East has been called
the "hub of civilization", and for good reason. In addition to being flanked by
the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, it is interspersed by five bodies of water; the
Red, Caspian, Black, and Mediterranean Seas, and the Persian Gulf.
Together these seas comprise the heaviest commerce and communications
lanes in the world. They have also been the sight of numerous naval and mili-
tary battles to control the main trade routes. The intense level of interaction
between Europe, Africa, and Asia at this "hub" have led to the coining of such
terms as chokepoints, crossroads, and critical interfaces with reference to
such strategically located junctures as the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of
Gibralter, and the Turkish Straits. In addition to these important commercial
transit lanes the Middle East is also home to the world's largest oil reserves.
In order to formulate an economic or political or strategic perspective on
policy with regard to the Middle East, an understanding of the importance of
oil, how much is used, and where it comes from is essential. It has been esti-
mated by some that the planet's oil supplies will be depleted within the next
80 years. This figure is popular in conversation but seems to attract contro-
versy among scholars. This controversy can be dispelled, however, with a
closer look at some simple facts. Estimates of oil supplies lasting roughly a
century into the future come from the simple equation of current consumption
rates, proven oil reserves, and estimated oil reserves. "Proven" oil reserves
are those reserves which are known to exist. They consist primarily of crude
deposits in underground reservoirs. The crude oil has not yet been refined,
but the capacity of the reservoirs can be estimated with accuracy. Today there
are 990 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. It is estimated that there are
another 500 billion barrels of oil recoverable using conventional methods
which remain undiscovered, with roughly half of this being under the oceans. 3
These figures taken together, that is, current proven reserves and reserves to
be expected from future exploration suggest that at current consumption
levels, conventional oil reserves will actually last about 70 years. This
translates to an annual world oil consumption rate of slightly more than 20
billion barrels per year. Global distribution of the 990 billion barrels in
proven reserves is highly concentrated. In fact, over 60% of the total figure
lies in the Middle East, and nearly 80 % (of the above mentioned 60%) lies in
a 500 by 800 mile region known as the Arabian Iranian Oil Province. Because
of this great concentration of the world's largest oil fields, it follows that these
huge reserves are concentrated in a small number of countries. In fact, only
four countries together contain 80% of the region's reserves, and they are
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, and Iraq. Furthermore, nearly all of these largest
oil fields lie virtually on the Persian Gulf.
Juxtaposed to these figures is the United States. Representing just 5% of
the world's population, the United States is by far the world's largest oil
guzzler, consuming almost 30% of the world's oil.4 The United States is
3Alasdair Drysdale and Gerald H. Blake, The Middle East and North Africa A Political
Geography (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 67.
4Kuntz, Congressional Quarterly, 21.
currently importing less than 20% of its oil needs though, but this figure will
inevitably begin increasing soon, however, as domestic supplies constitute
less than l/30th of the world's proven reserves.
While the Middle East is home to more than half of the proven reserves
of oil in the world, the United States has managed to reduce its imports of oil
from this region to a figure averaging as low as 10%, and by some estimates
as low as 6%. This reduction is largely the result of the first National Energy
Strategy enacted by the U.S. administration, in which the goal was to reduce
U.S. oil dependency on Middle East reserves. The question then seems to
arise as to why the United States has such an interest in the region. This
relatively small import figure would also seem to support critics of the U.S.
administration's putting troops at risk to protect such a small percentage of
imported oil supplies.
The answer to these questions lies in the fact that oil has now become a
single global market. In economic terms, oil has become a "fungible commod-
ity", which means that like precious metals or international stocks, when
prices increase in one part of the world, the subsequent effect is that prices
will increase world wide. Therefore, it does not matter so much where oil
comes from or how much is being imported. What does matter is how much of
the world's oil comes from a supplier who has driven the price up, thus driven
up the price world wide. By one estimate, for every dollar increase in the per
barrel price of oil, 3 billion dollars leaves the United States annually. This
takes on serious economic implications considering the fact that the price of
crude oil jumped from 20 dollars to over 40 dollars per barrel of crude after
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
Several national security challenges present themselves here. Energy
needs, oil dependency, and the sometimes seemingly fragile economic balance
associated with the price of oil all present complex global issues. The chang-
ing nature of the oil threat presents U.S. national security challenges that are
not readily apparent. The National Energy Strategy enacted by the U.S.
administration, although successful at meeting the perceived threat of oil
dependency, does not apply today. The transition of this national resource to
an international economic commodity presents a much more subtle threat
that will require an equal transition in U.S. national security strategy.
Furthermore, the nations of the Middle East are in a fragile balance. The
Arab-Israeli peace process, although making headway, continues to present
stumbling blocks on the path to stability in the region. The stability of the oil
producing nations themselves remains of critical interest to the United States
as well as potential regional conflicts on the horizon. The proliferation of
arms to the region will also present security challenges in the future of this
volatile region.
With this geographic and economic backdrop, the United States must re-
examine its interests in the Middle East. There is no question that oil is one
of the primary interests of the United States, and keeping in mind that the
Middle East is home to nearly two thirds of the world's oil reserves, it follows
that the U.S. has an obvious interest in the region. There is some debate,
however, as to why the U.S. has such an interest in oil. There are those who
profess that based on energy needs alone, the United States must continue to
maintain its access to the world's oil. On the other hand, there are those who
profess that the true security of the nation is not dependent on access and
utilization of these petroleum resources, but rather on the protection of these
resources from those who might chose to use it as an economic or political
weapon. Through the use of embargoes or resource hoarding, oil has been
used to gain an individual's or government's political or economic desires.
Now that oil is a world wide trade commodity, the impact of these embargoes,
and the associated price increases that accompany them affect the economies
of virtually every nation in the world. It appears then that oil, having made
this transition to a global market, now has an even greater attraction to those
who might wish to control it or use it as a weapon.
It is from these two camps then that a clearer illustration can be drawn
in denning U.S. interests in this lifeblood of the industrialized nations known
as oil.
The first question that needs to be answered with regard to U.S. interest
in oil as a natural resource is whether or not the United States can survive
without oil from the Middle East. And as already shown, the United States
currently imports roughly only 20% of the petroleum it consumes, and again,
figures averaging roughly 10% represent that petroleum imported from the
Middle East. It would appear by this low figure that measures enacted during
the oil crisis of the early 1970"s have proven effective in reducing Middle East
oil dependency, and thus U.S. vulnerability to the oil threat. Currently, 43%
of U.S. energy needs are met by petroleum.5
B. RESERVE TO PRODUCTION RATIOS
In considering figures regarding oil supplies, there are two concepts that
are helpful to understand. First, as mentioned earlier, proven reserves are
5Kuntz, Congressional Quarterly, 21.
those quantities with which a reasonable degree of certainty, can be recovered
from known reservoirs under existing operating and economic conditions. The
second concept is known as reserve to production ratio. This figure is obtained
by dividing the reserves remaining at the end of a given year by that year's
production rate. The resulting figure then gives the length of time that those
reserves would last if production continued at that level. The following table
shows percentages of world oil reserves by region and their respective reserve
to production ratios in years:
Region Share of World Total R.P. Ratio6
North America 5.7 % 9.0 yrs
Latin America 12.6% 37.7 yrs
Western Europe 2.6 % 12.2 yrs
Middle East 54.8 % 85.5 yrs
Atrica 7.3 % 29.3 yrs
Asia/Australia 2.5 % 14.3 yrs
This table shows how long reserves will last, by region, if the production
in each region were to continues at the current rate. Latin America is the
second largest figure at 37.7 years behind the Middle East. In other words, at
current production rates, in 37.7 years the Middle East will have a complete
monopoly on the world's remaining oil reserves.
This table also tells us that although the United States has managed to
reduce the amount of oil it imports from the Middle East, that it is only
"Michael Cunningham, Hostages to Fortune the Future of Western Interests in the Arabian Gulf
(London Oxford: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1988), 9.
putting off the inevitable choices of either finding alternative energy sources
or once again increasing its supplies from the Middle East. Furthermore, the
economic implications of these reserve to production ratios are that the
Middle East will eventually be the only supplier of this commodity, and thus
have potentially total control of the market. This dominance could eventually
lead to an economic monopoly, and some analysts have predicted that this
will occur by the year 2020. 7
Thus it can be concluded that reduction in the demand for oil and the
emergence of alternative energy sources has at times made Persian Gulf
security a lower priority for the United States than other areas of the world.
The fact remains, however, that the Gulf holds the majority of the world's
long term oil reserves, and bearing in mind the reserve to production ratios,
will eventually monopolize the market. It is somewhat optimistic to assume
that the United States, or any other nation, will become independent of oil for
its energy needs before supplies have completely dried up. This assumption
can be made based on costs. In the short term oil is still the least expensive
fossil fuel. There is a short term break point at which the price of oil becomes
greater than the cost of alternative fossil fuels. Analysts have estimated this
figure to be approximately $24 per barrel in 1991. When oil prices exceed $24
per barrel it is no longer the most cost effective fossil energy source for the
United States. Oil producers and suppliers are aware of this and realize that
it is in their best interests to keep oil prices stable. The concept does not
address the longer term and much greater impact of the infrastructure
changes that will inevitably have to take place as alternative energy sources
'Cunningham, 10.
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become the primary propellants of industry and transportation. The cost pro-
hibitive nature of this transition to alternative sources in the long term
combined with the political realities of sustaining the industrial base and
workforce lead to one conclusion. U.S. security interests will include the
natural resources aspect of oil itself, and will continue to do so until supplies
have diminished completely. It is the economic impact associated with this
resource that will be examined here, however.
The United States' economic interests in the region, although diverse,
have one common essential feature; oil. In securing gulf oil, and thus its
economic interests, the United States has fostered a strong commercial and
financial interdependence with gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia. This
interdependence has taken the form of U.S. exports of goods and services to
the region, U.S. investments, repatriation of U.S. oil company profits and
dividends,8 and several hundred thousand jobs for Americans which exports
generate. The Middle East is one of the fastest growing markets for U.S.
goods and services. This interdependence has helped to relieve some concern
of the Gulf states regarding their dependence on oil revenues, but as has been
seen, the gulf states are certainly not immune to the effects of dropping oil
prices. Oil producing states' vulnerability due to reliance on oil revenues for
their economies was one of the motivating factors for some Arab countries to
establish the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981. This is a coalition of some of
the more benign Gulf states, including some of the smaller oil producers, to
attempt to align and diversify their investments and form viable economic
°Peter J. Chelkowski and Robert J.Pranger, ed., Ideology and Power in the Middle East Studies
in Honor of George Lenczowski (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1988), 415.
11
policies. The GCC is favored by the United States in that political stability
seems to be one of the results of the formation of this cooperation, and just as
importantly from an economic standpoint. The United States has become
dependent upon the Gulf states to the degree that revenue generated from
U.S. exports to Arab states now totals more than five billion dollars per year.
Additionally, investments from Saudi Arabia alone, primarily in U.S.
government securities, is estimated at 70 billion dollars. The relationship
between the United States and the Middle East, specifically, the oil producing
states, keenly illustrates the definition of economic interdependence. The
adverse effects of rising and falling oil prices, notwithstanding belligerent
military intervention, can be combated with continued policies in favor of
economic integration, both within the region itself, and between the region
and the United States. Policies of this nature can not be expected to confront
every scenario, however.
Clearly it is in the best interest of the United States to promote stability
in the region through economic diversification and continued trade in order to
ensure America's access to gulf oil, and prepare for the inevitable eventuality
of diminishing oil supplies.9 But more importantly, the United States needs to
prepare itself for the combined effects of the Middle East region gaining a
monopoly on control of the world's oil and possible attempts at exploiting this
control. In order to understand the effects of such control, it is important to
understand how oil operates in the world economic marketplace.
Since the earliest beginnings of the oil production industry in the 1860's,
petroleum producing countries have comprised a diverse group of developed
9Chelkowski, 418.
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and developing countries that have included a wide range of regimes and
ideologies. In the 1930's a few of these countries became aware of the signifi-
cance of this natural resource that they were endowed with. Consequently,
they began to cooperate on an informal level. It was not until 1960, however,
that five of the leading oil producing countries came together to form their
first permanent organization. All developing countries, these first five mem-
bers were Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. The organization
is, of course, OPEC, or the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries,
and eight other nations have since joined. 10 The creation of OPEC was in
response to price cuts made by major concessionaires that then were com-
prised of seven transnational companies, five of which were American. OPEC
was conceived as a means of impeding or reversing such situations as 1) pric-
ing and production policies of foreign concessionaires which could undermine
the economic stability of the host country, 2) excessive economic dependence
on major industrialized countries whose policies could keep oil exporting
countries in a state of relative underdevelopment, and 3) compounding the
instability of the energy market. 11 OPEC has made successes for its member
countries. The nationalization of production facilities, refining plants, and
ownership of the oil companies themselves has brought wealth and develop-
ment to the member nations. The ownership and control of the world's largest
oil reserves has, in fact, shifted from what was once known as the concession-
aires of the major industrialized nations of the western world or, the




"majors", to the host countries themselves. This transfer process has not been
a completely smooth one, however. The member countries of OPEC do not
themselves represent a homogenous state of development or natural resource
endowment. On the contrary, they represent great economic diversity, and
this acts as a divisive factor in their efforts toward economic unity. Excess
capacity in some of the OPEC countries has led to a competition between
them, and one of the results of this competition is the change in the price of
oil.
C. OIL AS A COMMODITY
This introduces us to the concept of oil as a commodity. Oil now repre-
sents a world wide market in which the price is essentially one price. If for
some reason the price of oil goes up in one area of the world, then effectively
the price goes up everywhere. Understanding the basic laws of supply and
demand for this commodity are essential to the formulation of a security
policy which will address the economic power that the control of oil prices
entails. The price of oil is essentially driven by the basic laws of supply and
demand. In the short term, supply can be affected by any number of factors,
ranging from weather to shipping accidents. The price surges of these short
term effects can lead to speculation buying and this will subsequently push
the price of oil up higher than alternative sources of energy. These short term
price hikes are possible because of the preventively high costs of long term
energy alternatives and the length of time required to bring these alternative
energy sources on line.
The long term price of energy will be affected by factors that will require
a structural transformation in societies, primarily in the area of public
14
transportation. Price quotations for daily "spot" transactions for oil then are
obviously more sensitive to the short term factors.
Until the mid 1970's, the largest part of transnational petroleum trans-
actions were based on long term contracts between the network of major inte-
grated oil companies. Shortages and surpluses did not appear on the open
market because of the careful management of supplies to match the varia-
tions in demand. Most oil exporting countries had accepted these random
variations in off-take as decided by their concessionaires (which were the
major transnational companies). The nationalization of these concessions as
well as the increase in the number of independent companies have
contributed to the emergence of an open market in which sales now take
place between unrelated companies. 12
This growth in the number of independents has brought with it a transi-
tion of the price of oil from the "term" market to the "spot" market. This tran-
sition has increased the volatility of oil prices. In times of shortage, the
independent actors nervously bid up the price of oil to obtain the required
supplies. Conversely, in a surplus situation, independents are tempted to
reduce prices to expand sales. The major companies can afford, however, to
absorb these fluctuations through diversification, and the result is oil price
wars.
This evolution of oil as a commodity has resulted in a multitude of
factors that influence its price. While a country's natural resources, the struc-
ture of the industry, and corporate strategies represent important factors in
12Mikdashi. 30.
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supply and demand and the price of oil, the policies and actions of govern-
ments do too.
Before examining how governments intervene in shaping oil policies,
however, one should have a basic understanding of the development of the oil
market, the place in which oil, the commodity, operates. As early as 1945, oil
supplies have been threatened by conflict. The Suez Canal was blocked in
1956, and in 1967 Israel attacked Egypt's armies and the Arabs threatened to
embargo supplies to the United States. Again in 1973 and in 1979 the world
economy shuddered as a result of events in the Middle East. While these con-
flicts may appear to be dated information, many of the markets and firms and
policies that shape oil's response to those shocks are less than 20 years old.
How the oil price, and thus the price paid by companies and consumers
respond to crisis events like the Persian Gulf war depend on how the markets
operate.
The development of the oil market began with the rapid rise in the
consumption of oil following World War II. The consumption of oil is rela-
tively easy and cheap in comparison to coal, and it is easier to transport than
gas. From 10 million barrels per day in 1950, the world now consumes 65 mil-
lion barrels per day. Tankers carried 11 billion barrels of crude and refined oil
in 1989. That is more by weight than the world's next three most traded
commodities, iron ore, coal, and grain combined.
Producers of oil have tried to overcome the volatility of this commodity
as a resource, as already discussed, through attempted monopolies and
cartels. These proved to provide only temporary relief, however, as has been
shown, the volatile price of oil shifted from long term market transitions to
the spot market. By 1982, more than half of internationally traded oil was
16
priced according to spot rates. The reason for this is that violent changes in
price make long term fixed price contracts too risky. The oil market is now
built around three exchanges: the New York Mercantile Exchange, the
International Petroleum Exchange, and the Singapore International
Monetary Exchange. The oil market remains an immature one, and its weak-
ness lies in the spot markets. Prices around the world are normally kept
stable either through arbitrage or through adjustments in supply, as in the
case of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is an example of a nation who is aware of
the adverse effects of skyrocketing oil prices. If, as demonstrated in the
Persian Gulf War, oil prices increase substantially as a result of a belligerent
nation attempting to hoard or control more oil, then Saudi Arabia will
increase production, thus increasing supply, thus reducing demand and
reducing prices. Furthermore, after a crisis such as the invasion of Kuwait,
some nations who own oil stock tend to hoard it or not even sell it at all.
One thing is certain, and that is that the oil production industry has not
seen its last interruption. The question becomes then, how vulnerable is this
industry and how vulnerable are the nations whose economies now revolve
around this industry.
The effectiveness of Saddam Hussein's tactics regarding oil during the
Persian Gulf crisis proved to be short of what the world might have expected.
It is true that many western governments were spoiled by the oil glut of the
1980's and the balance between supply and demand is tighter than some had
thought. As Hussein hoarded his oil, the world supply decreased. This
decrease in supply created an increase in demand, and thus an increase in
price. Again, if price goes up in one part of the world, then the price goes up
on the world market, and virtually every nation in the world is effected. The
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issue then becomes one of how to restore supply, and hence prices, to pre-
crisis levels. Many OPEC countries can easily produce more oil than they do
currently, but if prices are high, it would seem that they have no incentive to
produce more. The alternative then is for governments to tap into their
strategic reserves or find an incentive for increased production for other coun-
tries, 13 or apply pressure to the producing countries either politically or
militarily.
If in fact, however, some person or government is able to gain control of
enough oil supplies to drive oil prices up, either for a short time or some
sustained period, then the effect of this aspect itself deserves examination.
The different nations of the world, although all part of a global economic
market, will suffer different effects as a result of oil price increases. A
measure of this vulnerability was done in one study in which the oil produc-
ing nations of the world were ranked in order of their sensitivity to oil prices.
The quantitative analysis done measured the following factors: 1) Oil Self
Sufficiency. This was measured by showing the net oil trade balance as a per-
centage of GDP. The bigger a country's net imports, the greater its loss of
income to oil exporters when prices rise. 2) Energy Efficiency. This measure
showed the consumption of energy (in tons of oil equivalent) as a ratio of
GDP. 3) Oil Dependency. In a short term price increase, economies which are
most dependent on oil will be hit the hardest. 4) Trade with OPEC. This
figure compares the relative amount of a country's exports to OPEC countries
(other than Iraq and Kuwait, embargoed at the time of the study). These
four indicators were then ranked for each country from 1 (being the least
™The Economist, "Breathe in and Squeeze", August 11, 1990.
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vulnerable) to 16 (most vulnerable). These were then added together,
doubling the values for oil imports and oil efficiency to reflect their relative
importance. The three relative winners (those who would be least hurt by
price hikes) were Australia, Japan, and Argentina. The three countries
ranked most vulnerable were Turkey, Czechoslovakia, and South Africa. The
United States got a score of 7, again with 1 being least vulnerable and 16
being most vulnerable. 14 A study such as this might be used as an indicator or
predictor should another crisis occur, and certainly can be used as a
preventative tool for the future of the economies of the world. The study falls
short, however, if we reconsider the concept of reserve to production ratio.
This concept again forecasts that within thirty to forty years the Middle East
could hold a complete monopoly on oil reserves, in which case a nation's
vulnerability would be more a function of imports and consumption, rather
than the other factors.
The solution to this problem lies in the following concept. As oil prices
rise, oil companies are inclined to hoard supplies, keeping the price high. The
rising price reaches the break point, however, where, as discussed, the use of
an alternative energy source becomes more cost effective. It is true, as
mentioned earlier, that the transition to a completely new technology is pre-
vented by both cost and time, but in the short term, gas and coal can act as a
substitute for oil in many industries. In fact, many power plants have the
ability to operate on different fuels. Furthermore, the more moderate oil pro-
ducing countries have the foresight to understand the law of diminishing
returns. The higher the price of oil, the more incentive industrialized nations
1477ie Economist, "Who Dares Wins...and Loses", September 1, 1990.
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will have to begin the search for alternative energy technology. As structural
changes occur in societies as a result of these new technologies, the demand
for oil will begin to drop. The conclusion that we can draw from this is that it
is in the best interests of the oil producing nations to keep prices at a moder-
ate level. In the long run, the basic market forces of supply and demand will
aid in keeping prices moderated. It is the short sighted belligerent that is
looking to make a quick buck, or trying to use oil as a weapon that poses a
threat. And if, as some have predicted, the Middle East does in fact soon hold
a monopoly over the world oil market, it would seem to be a much more
attractive target for a potential belligerent.
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III. U.S. RESPONSE TO DIMINISHING OIL SUPPLIES
We have established that the United States is vulnerable, at least to
some degree, to both the diminishing supplies of the world's oil, and in
particular, the economic effects that accompany disruptions to those supplies.
The response to those vulnerabilities, and their effectiveness is what will be
examined in this chapter.
The oil price hikes of the 1970's led to an unprecedented federal effort
toward a national energy security policy. Although many energy laws were
enacted that decade, it is arguable that none seem to have had any long term
comprehensive effect on the nation's current energy security needs. Today,
nearly 20 years later, the current U.S. Administration is debating the
National Energy Strategy for 1992/3. As mentioned in the introduction, the
Persian Gulf war is the third time in the last 20 years that the United States
has become vulnerable to oil supply disruptions. The Arab oil embargo of
1973 led to the passage of a number of measures aimed at protecting the
nation from the adverse effects of these disruptions. Some progress was made
during the seventies in the areas of energy conservation and efficiency, but
these efforts failed to address the issue of short term vulnerability, and only
acted to forestall the inevitable depletion of oil resources. Another result of
the oil shocks of the seventies was the creation of the International Energy
Agency. One of the concepts behind the LEA was that in the event of an inter-
ruption to OPEC oil supplies, each of the signatories of the agency would call
for a pooling of energy resources to guarantee a supply sufficient to meet
energy requirements to an agreed minimum. The offspring of this concept
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was the development of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. The reserve was
designed to contain enough petroleum to sustain normal consumption for
ninety days. The concept of the SPR is to maintain a safety margin in the
event of an interruption to OPEC oil flow, and to act as a deterrent to the use
of oil flow restrictions as a political weapon. Today, the U.S. Strategic
Petroleum Reserve holds about a seventy day supply of oil. 15
1979 saw the flow of oil again reduced as a result of the Iranian revolu-
tion. Then in 1986, world oil prices dropped, discouraging the development of
alternative sources and technologies, and discouraging investment in U.S. oil
exploration. Since 1985, the amount of oil imported each day to the United
States has more than doubled, but it was not until the Persian Gulf crisis
that the oil dependency issue again gained enough "popularity" to lead policy
makers into action, and call for a renewed federal effort in reaching a com-
prehensive energy policy. 16
A. NATIONAL ENERGY STRATEGY
In July of 1989 President Bush and Energy Secretary James D. Watkins
announced their plan to draft a "National Energy Strategy", promising to
stress conservation and efficiency. 17 Eighteen months later, in February of
1991, the Administration plan was unveiled, and it advocated increased
domestic energy production, reduced energy demand, promotion of new
foreign supplies of oil, and some energy conservation measures.
15Sarah Orrick, ed., "National Energy Policy", Congressional Digest, May 1991, 130.
16Orrick, 130.
1
'Holly Idelson, "Senate Filibuster Deals Blow to Plan for New Policy", Congressional Quarterly,
2 November 1991, 3191.
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The impetus for this effort toward the National Energy Strategy was
clearly the Persian Gulf War. As a result of the crisis, energy policy was once
again front page news. When soldiers began returning home, however, the
panic of the crisis in the Gulf had turned to a heroes welcome, and public con-
cern about energy security was fading.
As a crisis recedes then, impetus for any far reaching legislation gives
way to regional and political interests. The outbreak of the 1973 Arab Israeli
War and the October OPEC oil embargo provided for the response from the
Nixon Administration to call for a goal of zero oil dependence. The result was
the establishment of the Federal Energy Administration and an emergency
rationing plan; a far cry from zero foreign oil dependence. In February of 1977
President Jimmy Carter held a "fireside chat" on the energy crisis, warning of
natural gas shortages. The resulting legislation was a watered down version
of Carter's plan, adopting some conservation measures. In 1980 at the out-
break of the Iran Iraq war President Reagan called for federal support of a
synthetic fuels program, and faster development of nuclear power. In 1981
with the release of American hostages held in Iran, congress allowed the syn-
thetic fuels program to die.
And then in 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait and oil prices jumped. The follow-
ing month the Strategic Petroleum Reserve was expanded. It seems that the
Administration is somewhat hesitant to use the reserve, however, and some
are questioning its usefulness. In 1978, Mr. David Stockman, impatient with
President Carter's energy hysteria, said that the government needed but two
policies: strategic arms and strategic reserves. Experts and congressmen
argued that it was time to tap the reserve.
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The Strategic Petroleum Reserve legislation gives total discretion to the
President to declare an energy emergency. That term has not been denned.
Another stumbling block in the process is that a SPR drawdown must be
agreed upon by all other IEA members holding reserves. Other claims about
the reserve are that its heavy high sulphur crude is difficult to refine, and
that there are physical problems pumping it out.
Policy reasons for hesitancy in utilizing the reserve also exist. The
Administration would prefer to exert pressure on other producers to make up
for lost oil, or that oil companies draw on their own reserves. The question as
to whether or not the SPR is effective, it seems, will only be answered if oil
prices somehow manage to stay high long enough. At the relatively high cost
of 27 dollars per barrel, and an annual maintenance cost paid by taxpayers, it
may appear that the SPR is simply letting other producers off the hook. 18 It
seems clear then that efforts in the area of domestic energy policy are in fact
simply a reaction or response process, and one that simply loses its momen-
tum as a function of public interest and crisis management.
This has been the evolution of what today we are calling our national
energy security policy. One might argue that a sense of urgency is really not
needed, at least not yet, and that the efforts and policies in place, although
slow, are steady and making headway in a comprehensive energy strategy.
Conversely, one might point out that worries in Washington about U.S.
energy security have dwindled after the defeat of Iraq in the Persian Gulf
War, and that the war summed up the U.S. Government's unstated security
18 77ie Economist, "Oiled", September 22, 1990.
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policy, which can be seen as simply defending shipments of imported oil, by
force if necessary.
According to some analysts, since the oil price shock of 1973, the world's
economies have increased in their preparedness for such shocks, and have
reduced their vulnerability to the same. This conclusion is drawn through an
analysis ofGNP transfer. Whatever the oil price might jump to as a result of
supply disruption, its impact should be smaller than in the past. To produce a
dollar of real GNP, industrial economies now use 40% less oil than they did in
1973. Higher oil prices have encouraged consumers to shift to other fuels. The
age of computer technology means that industries consume less of all com-
modities, including energy. In both the previous two energy shocks OECD
economies had to transfer roughly 2% of their income to OPEC producers.
Even if oil prices were to rise by the same percentage as they did in 1978-79,
the transfer of GNP would be no more than 1%. Additionally, in the two oil
price shocks of the seventies, the deflationary impact of this initial loss of
actual outcome was enhanced because of the fact that OPEC countries could
not spend all of the extra petrodollars immediately. 19
This coupled with the fact that financial markets are more competitive
tells us that the world's economies can prepare themselves for oil price hike
shocks, rendering the use of oil as a weapon less effective. The result is that
one argument shows that even if there are supply disruptions and prices do
skyrocket, that the economy can potentially absorb it. Additionally, we have
determined that because soaring prices force consumers and consuming
nations to cut back on demand by increasing efficiency, switching to other
19The Economist, " Third Time Lucky", August 11, 1990, 13.
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fuels, developing alternatives and increasing domestic production, that it is in
the best interests of the oil producing nations to keep prices stable.
The upshot of this is that if a belligerent nation attempts to use oil as a
weapon, they can hike prices up in the short run, but these high prices simply
cannot be sustained. There might be a more serious effect if the belligerent
was able to control too much oil, however, as is the case in the second argu-
ment, in which it is predicted that the Middle East will soon hold a monopoly
on the world's remaining oil. As in the Persian Gulf war, the panic that drove
prices up initially was the fear that Hussein might gain control of some or all
of the oil fields in Saudi Arabia. This poses a greater threat in that one of the
price stabilizing mechanisms in a price shock is to have the friendly OPEC
countries increase production. Barring this, and of course, the use of force, the
only back up plan is the use of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve.
With regard to a domestic energy strategy, it seems that there is simply
not enough incentive to make the shift to an alternative energy source before
the oil runs out. The oil will, in fact, run out. It may take longer than some
have predicted if consumption is reduced, but the high cost of exploring and
extracting yet to be discovered oil reserves will not prove as cost effective as
an alternative. History of the domestic energy strategy clearly indicates that
efforts in reducing oil dependency have been in response to oil price shocks.
If, as we have concluded above, these shocks can be increasingly absorbed by
the world's economies, then that reduces the incentive to find alternative
energy sources even further. If, however, one belligerent government or indi-
vidual is able to exploit the predicted monopoly scenario, then there may not
be a friendly OPEC country to increase production.
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One can assume then that the industrialized nations of the world will
continue to use oil before turning completely to another energy source. This
brings us back once again to the concept of reserve to production ratios.
Assuming that market forces, government policies, and military forces all act
to continue to stabilize the price of oil for the next forty years, what will
happen when all of the oil remaining on the planet is in the Middle East? If
we take what we know about the current oil market and try to extrapolate
that information into the future, what will the world look like if the Middle
East has a total oil monopoly? Will the financial, political, and security inter-
dependencies between the oil producing states and the superpowers act to
facilitate a stable world, or will the market be completely in the hands of the
nations of the Middle East and the rest of the world will be at the mercy of
the oil pricers?
There is no question that oil will be a key factor in either the rivalry or
the cooperation among nations for at least the first half of the twenty first
century, and countries and companies concerned about the longer term will
have to demonstrate the capacity to adjust to changing market conditions to
maintain stability. They will also have to develop the skills necessary to
confront and solve problems that arise in the world's ever changing socio-
political environment. A brief historical analysis of policy responses follows.
B. U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST
Historically, the three main reasons for the United States' concern with
the Middle East have been 1) the containment of the Soviet Union, 2) the
"special relationship" with Israel, and 3) guaranteeing access to its oil
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resources. Since World War II these reasons have provided the essence of
America's interest in this strategic region.
Beginning with the containment of the Soviet Union, U.S. policy has
historically been predicated on combating the spread of Soviet influence, and
the assumption of Soviet expansion with regard to the vulnerable Middle
East. With the end of World War II and the onset of Soviet-American rivalry,
U.S. goals grew in pursuit of a grand containment strategy of the Soviet
Union. The Truman Administration first developed a containment plan
directed at the Soviet Union in northern Iran and later against communist
plans in Greece and Turkey. Every subsequent administration has in one way
or another built on this containment policy, with the Middle Eastern empha-
sis on the Soviet border, or the "northern tier u states as they are known.20
Keeping Soviet expansion at bay in the northern tier has taken the form of
military and economic aid, and has been done without major contradiction,
being couched in the principle of self-determination. Since 1979, several
events have focused American attention sharply on the Gulf region, including
the fall of the Shah of Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Iran-
Iraq war. These events highlighted further fears of Soviet expansion in the
region, and in 1980 President Jimmy Carter declared that the United States
was willing to use any means necessary to defend the vital interests of the
United States in the Gulf region.21 This policy has continued with Presidents
Reagan and Bush.
20Peter J. Chelkowski and Robert J. Pranger, ed., Ideology and Power in the Middle East Studies
in Honor of George Lenczowski (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1988) 433.
21 Drysdale, 34.
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The Soviet Union then, has obviously overshadowed the politics of the
Middle East. Containment of the Soviet Union has been the prime driver of
American foreign policy since the end of World War II. The collapse of the
Soviet Union then brings new concerns to the forefront, and will require a
restructuring of U.S. foreign policy. One of the more significant concerns is
the void of Soviet-American competition and the subsequent moderation of
formally pro-Soviet states. To some degree, what was a "balanced" competi-
tion for influence in the region may now appear to look more like U.S. imperi-
alism. That is to say, the influence of the United States previously exercised
in the region could be couched in the language of self-determination, and that
the balance of thwarting the Soviet menace may now look more like the
United States grabbing up the spoils of the cold war. This "power vacuum" as
it has been called, now forces by default, the character of U.S. foreign policy
to shift away from blocking Soviet expansion to some new, and as yet to be
determined appropriate policy.
The second reason the United States is concerned with the Middle East
is the "special relationship" with Israel. There are over six million Jews in the
United States who play a key role in shaping U.S. policy toward Israel and
the Middle East.22 This is a simplified observation and does not address the
multitude of complexities that explain U.S. ties with Israel or the Middle
East, but from a very basic standpoint, this represents the essence of the
"special relationship." The next logical observation then is the Arab-Israeli
conflict and the consequential strain on the United States to attempt to
promote positive relations with both the Israelis and the Arabs, specifically
22Drysdale, 33.
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the Palestinian Arabs. On the one hand, Israel has a place as a strategic
stronghold for the United States in the Middle East and to whom the United
States has supplied large amounts of arms to; on the other hand, it is the
Arab countries, primarily Saudi Arabia where most of the United States'
third vital interest in the region lies, oil, and with whom the United States
has fostered economic relations with in order to ensure the continued flow
and price stabilizing effects of oil supplies.
The making of American policy toward the Middle East, and Saudi
Arabia in particular, has been dictated by two nearly opposing forces. One is
determined by the politics of oil, and the other by the special relationship
Israel enjoys with the United States. This has created a dichotomy that has
made American policy toward the Middle East very difficult to manage.
Support has been given to both Arab and Israeli objectives in the region mak-
ing both parties suspicious of favoritism. Israel is considered by many to be a
strategic as well as an ideological partner, and conversely, many Arab coun-
tries see Israel as one of the prime regional threats. The resolution of this
conflict has been a foreign policy dilemma for nearly every U.S. administra-
tion since the establishment of the state of Israel. These opposing forces
promise to continue to hold the attention of U.S. foreign policy makers at
least as long as the U.S. holds other interests in the region, and the conflict
remains unresolved.
U.S. political responses in attempting to reduce the vulnerability of the
oil fields have included economic and military assistance in key states.
Military assistance has been balanced back and forth between belligerent
regional states, and states along the northern tier directed at the former
soviet threat. Other policies, such as the establishment of the International
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Energy Agency, have been aimed at ensuring adequate oil supplies in the
event of a halt of gulf oil shipments. These policies, however, have been short
term in nature and have not addressed the eventuality of oil supply depletion.
Part of the difficulty in managing Middle Eastern policies has been the
unpredictability of revolutionary upheaval in some of the oil producing states.
This may be due in part to the lack of understanding of U.S. foreign policy
makers with regard to the inner dynamics of the Islamic world and the
concerns of its policy makers. Policy concerns with regard to the Arab Israeli
conflict present some of the same dilemmas. 1978 saw some of the first seri-
ous strains of this nature on the United States in trying to maintain gulf
security while also maintaining Israel's preferential status. Attempts by
congress to maintain this even-handedness in military aid to both Saudi
Arabia and Israel in the form of F-15 and F-16 fighter jets drew much opposi-
tion in congress from Israeli lobbyists. Similar disputes ensued over AWACS
radar planes being placed in Saudi Arabia.
The prospects for peace in the Middle East are then of critical national
interest. The fact that soviet competition for the strategic prize has all but
vanished does not lessen but increase the United States' interest in the
region. Diplomatic innovations made here may have applications in a more
far reaching sense, beyond the region itself, and this prospect alone is deserv-
ing of greater comprehensive foreign policy attention. As the backbone of the
pro-western oil producing states, however, Saudi Arabia seems to be the most
prominent figure as partner to the United States in pursuing its national
security interests in the Persian Gulf. Strides have been made by Saudi
Arabia with the smaller moderate states of the GCC in forming military and
political alliances, and as evidenced by the Persian Gulf War, Saudi Arabia
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has taken on an increasingly pro-western orientation. If Saudi Arabia is to
continue to act as a moderating force in the Gulf and as a cooperative partner
to the United States in seeking their mutual interests, then this resource rich
country deserves close attention.
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IV. THE IMPACT OF THE OIL INDUSTRY ON SAUDI ARABIA
An assumption made here, as the previous chapters have demonstrated,
is that Saudi Arabia is the primary vehicle through which the United States
has implemented its Persian Gulf security policy. This assumption is based
on 1) as holder of the world's largest oil reserves, Saudi Arabia is of obvious
national interest to the United States, 2) its moderate posture with regard to
maintaining oil supply, and thus oil price stability are in keeping with U.S.
national interests, 3) Saudi Arabia's economic interdependence with the U.S.
acts to further supplement cooperation through mutually beneficial invest-
ments of both capital and labor, and finally, 4) Saudi Arabia has acted most
recently as a critical military partner in the pursuit of U.S. national interests.
If this critical and cooperative relationship is to remain strong and
intact, a basic understanding of this country's development from an interna-
tional perspective is essential. This chapter will examine how the oil industry
has impacted the development of Saudi Arabia. More specifically, it will
examine how an "imposed " industrial revolution brought on by the discovery
of oil in Saudi Arabia has enhanced or hindered the social mobilization
process, and thus the development of Saudi Arabia as a nation. This will
prove to be of critical interest in the near future as the Middle East begins to
gain a monopoly on the world's remaining oil reserves. We will define social
mobilization as that intermediate step between pre-industrial and industrial
society in which, as a part of modern development, a greater demand for
public participation is prompted in both political and economic arenas. We
might expect Saudi Arabia, as an experiment in rapid industrialization, to
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exhibit diminishing tribal or ethnic orientations, and ultimately a growing
orientation toward stable nationalism, particularly in the case of a state with
an abundance of a natural resource.23
Conversely, for third world governments, others might expect social and
economic development to carry the risk of political instability, particularly if
it is effective enough to bring disparities into prominence.24 In this sense, the
process of development and industrialization might be viewed in temporal
stages. That is, the stability, the degree of participation, and the degree of
social mobilization might all be a function of what "stage" of development a
state is in. A state undergoing development might exhibit unrest and instabil-
ity as a natural prelude to stability, in other words, those states exhibiting
unrest may simply not have reached what we in the West call a mature stage
of development in the context of industrialized nations. Some authors have
called this process the democratization of an authoritarian regime. This
"process' through which a states goes as part of modernization and industrial-
ization, and its effects on social mobilization, is certainly worth close scrutiny
in the case of Saudi Arabia.
A. FORMATION OF THE KINGDOM
The formal foundation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia took place in
1932, when the majority of the world powers recognized the sovereignty of the
new country. One year later King Abdul Aziz granted the now-historic right
to the Standard Oil Company of California (SOCAL) to prospect for oil in the
^Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (New York: Cornell University Press, 1983),72.
24Yezid Sayigh, Aldelphi Papers 251, Confronting the 1990's: Security in the Developing
Countries (Brassey's for the IISS, 1990)
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Kingdom. By 1939 oil was being pumped from Saudi reserves. Prior to World
War II these resources were being exploited completely by western compa-
nies, however, under a program of concessions. In exchange for these conces-
sions, which had nearly unlimited access, the host countries were granted
modest royalties. 25 Prompted by the desire to protect national interests, host
countries have sought to gain effective control over their oil sectors since WW
II. Not until December of 1950 did Saudi Arabia and ARAMCO make the first
major change in the concession plan by concluding a 50/50 profit sharing
agreement. Foremost among these strategies is, as already mentioned, OPEC,
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, established in 1960. The
organization serves as a collective defense mechanism for developing coun-
tries heavily dependent on oil exports, and since its inception, member coun-
tries' share in the production of their petroleum production has risen from a
mere 2% to over 75%.26 This increase has resulted mainly from the purchase
or nationalization of oil assets previously owned by major transnational com-
panies. Today we know that Saudi Arabia alone contains 27% of the world's
proven oil reserves.
Conditions in the world oil market changed markedly in the early 1970's.
First individually and later collectively, OPEC member states began taking
the initiative in obtaining better treatment in their relations with the conces-
sionaire companies. Prices were increased, foreign companies were national-
ized, and conservation laws were legislated in several member states. OPEC




countries were assisted by several factors in this, among them, the increasing
dependence of the industrial countries on cheap OPEC oil, and failure to dis-
cover comparable reserves elsewhere.
The turning point came in October of 1973 when two separate decisions
were made which changed the course of the international oil industry and
eventually had a major impact on the Arab states and the world as a whole.
The first was OPEC's decision to set oil prices and production unilaterally,
and the second was to reduce supplies to those states that were aiding Israel.
As a result of these developments, OPEC states had gained almost com-
plete sovereignty over its most important asset, and hence the price of this
asset. The huge influx of cash provided extremely high rates of economic
growth. Despite the positive contribution of this influx of wealth, however, it
can certainly be argued that this same influx has resulted in the loss of social
and economic opportunities.
It was during this time frame under the reign of King Faisal (1964—75)
that Saudi Arabia saw its first enormous increases in oil wealth, and the
Kingdom's industrial development began in earnest. For this reason, we
might expect that the origins of today's successes or failures of Saudi Arabia's
industrialization might be traced to these beginnings.
To his credit, King Faisal was aware of the ramifications of his country's
natural resources. His conscious decision to modernize saw the birth of his
five year development plans, in which, according to one author, the four steps
required to maintain a technology based export economy were included. King
Faisal was able to accomplish three of the four, acknowledged the need to
complete the fourth, but was unable to do so. The four elements are 1) an
economy that can attract technology, 2) an ability to convert technology to
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higher levels of capital formation, 3) an economy that can produce capital
goods instead of only consumer goods, and the fourth critical step is the
ability of an economy to generate its own technology. Of this step, King Faisal
had this to say:
It is within our power, for example, to erect an enormous plant, but
can we run the plant properly or get the desired results from it? In my
opinion it is far better to equip ourselves with the ability to do things
on our own without relying on foreigners or anyone else.27
Saudi Arabia's abundance of resources and the vision of King Faisal
have combined to help Saudi Arabia meet the first three steps, but the fourth,
according to this analysis, may be the obstacle preventing Saudi Arabia's
socio-economic structure from reaching more mature stages. This may be due
in part to the manner in which development has taken place in most oil rich
countries.
Developmental projects have been oriented toward three areas, infras-
tructure, industrialization, and social welfare. Metropolitan areas have usu-
ally received precedence over rural areas in budgetary allocations, and often
emphasis is placed on large "showy" projects whose beneficial effects on soci-
ety have been questionable. Lack of care and mismanagement has led often to
redundant facilities and unfinished projects. One of the by-products of this
misguided development is inflation. This inflation simply compounds the




B. THE RENTIER CONCEPT
The fact that some countries derive much of their prosperity from
unearned income has fostered a "rentier" mentality. This has discouraged
entrepreneurship and hard work and has promoted a spirit of easy gain. Let
us now define the term "rentier." States that derive the majority of their
income from rents rather than from the productive capacity of their citizens
are known as rentier states. Other typical features of a rentier state are 1)
the majority of the states revenue is derived from rents on a natural resource,
2) the extraction or exploitation of the resource is a technologically intensive
undertaking which employs few members of the indigenous economy, 3) the
rents received from the export of the product are concentrated in the hands of
the state, 4) the technical skills required for the extraction of the resource are
concentrated in the hands of a few technicians from industrialized states, and
finally 5) the rents derived are from the sale of a non renewable resource.
Certainly Saudi Arabia, as well as many other Gulf oil producing states falls
into this category of rentier economies.28 And Certainly, the discovery of oil
has provided for many advantages which Saudi Arabia enjoys over less fortu-
nate third world states in terms of resource endowment. Economically, the
rentier state enjoys the capital required to build an infrastructure of roads
and communications networks, and to train and educate its population in its
transition from an agrarian to a modern industrial economy.
Rentier states might also enjoy political advantages over their less pros-
perous counterparts. The distribution of the wealth over all segments of the
2
°Robert W, Stookey, ed., The Arabian Peninsula, Zone in Ferment (Stanford: Hoover Institution
Press, 1984), 26.
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population may enhance the legitimacy of its leaders. Additionally, the huge
capital available to the economy requires little or no taxation necessary for
development programs.
Finally, the available capital allows the leaders of such an economy
which can allow for the purchase of a security system which can further
enhance stability and legitimacy.29
It has been hypothesized, however, that despite these advantages expe-
rienced by a rentier economy such as Saudi Arabia, that the exhaustion of
these precious oil resources will mean that this time of prosperity will only be
temporary. Even though Saudi Arabia has undergone massive development
in many areas, the rate of economic development in terms of productive
capacity in non petroleum areas has not been enough to build a self sustain-
ing industrial economy. This, according to one author, is the result of im-
ported equipment and labor, and the work values of the Saudi Arabian
people.30
At the basis of a modern industrialized society is a workforce of skilled
and semi-skilled laborers. This force provides the link between the planners
and engineers and the unskilled manual labor force, and is an essential
component of a society's productive capacity. It is this component, as some
have asserted, that is missing from Saudi society. There seems to be a reluc-
tance of the Saudi population to become involved in the manual skilled and





simply lacking an industrial work ethic. A population that, at least in part,
has undergone a transformation from agrarian or Bedouin to one of enormous
capital influx and unheard of wealth in the span of only a few decades, and
expresses a general disdain for manual labor might very well be perceived
from a western point of view as simply unwilling to work. This notion is cer-
tainly not a mysterious one. Simply put, it seems reasonable that one might
chose not to work if one is already enjoying the benefits of great wealth.
Other manifestations of the traditional Islamic work ethic are asserted by
another author, in which we might see a connection between those traditional
views of Islamic work ethic and a more modern day version of what we see in
the Middle East today. He asserts that there are three factors which repre-
sent the work values of traditional societies. First is the idea that manual
labor tends to be regarded as shameful. In societies of tribal origin, such jobs
as carpentry might be disdained. Second, the attachment of traditional indi-
viduals to their extended families precludes their willingness to relocate,
hence preventing the establishment of a mobile workforce. Reinforcement of
traditional family values are thus strengthened, and so is the reluctance of an
individual to accept a low prestige job. Third, members of traditional soci-
eties, according to one study, tend to place less emphasis on goal or achieve-
ment oriented behavior, and more on conformity and group acceptance. In
Saudi Arabia the extended family structure remains the norm.
Indeed, it has been asserted that whatever the human costs, there can
be little doubt that there is a strong link between an achievement oriented
population and economic development. In traditional societies, valued people
maintain the status quo. And societies favoring conformist values over
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individuality lack the psychic energy or drive necessary to transform their
primary economies into diversified industrialized economies.32
One study suggests that the relationship between monetary and prestige
incentives is one that presents an obstacle to change in behavior patterns in
Saudi Arabia. The study proposes, essentially, that two factors will sustain
current behavior patterns in Saudi society, and keep the government from
succeeding at its attempts to break the rentier pattern. The first factor is that
in a rentier state, ironically, as money becomes more readily available, it
tends to lose its incentive value. In a rentier state one simply does not need to
work as hard or sacrifice traditional values in order to enjoy an acceptable
standard of living.
The second factor is that in these traditional societies in transition from
non-industrialized to industrialized ones, there is more motivation toward
gaining prestige, as perceived by one's peers and family, than in gaining
wealth. The author of the study attempts to show through a survey of Saudi
university age youth, that a greater incentive for prestigious work, that is,
the avoidance of a low prestige, or manual labor job, exists, rather than for
the monetary reward associated with the job.33
In the west, our industrialized society might simply reduce this to the
notion that again, "why should one work if one does not need to?" This notion,
combined with the extended family structures still present in Saudi Arabia
and the accompanying desire for prestige and authority in that structure




industrial workforce by the indigenous population. Another much more
complex explanation for this apparent lack of ability of Saudi Arabia to build
its own indigenous workforce may lie in the political arena.
One author proposes that while economic and material evolutions of
large parts of Saudi Arabia have been extremely rapid, social development
has been patchy, and political development has been almost nil.34 According
this view, the lopsided economic growth has actually militated against the
achievement of economic maturity, and furthermore, oil wealth has served to
put a halt to growth in Saudi Arabia's political system since oil wealth has
become concentrated in the hands of the ruling family. The ruling family,
then, uses the wealth as an instrument for securing its monopoly of political
power. Certainly a factor that cannot be overlooked with regard to political
power in Saudi Arabia is its relationship with the United States. The U.S. oil
industry and U.S. diplomatic service has extremely close contacts with the
government of Saudi Arabia, and these links have ensured that the first point
of reference for Saudi Arabian leaders in virtually all foreign affairs other
than those concerned only with religion is the U.S. The U.S., of course, sees
Saudi Arabia as its principle source of moderation within OPEC and political
stability in the Arabian Peninsula.
In this light, it might be in the best interest of the ruling family to
shelter the country from radical change, to preserve its political power
through actually subsidizing tribal notables and purchasing political support
in rural areas. In fact, as late as the 1980's, Saudi Arabia was reporting no
34Richard Ian Netton, ed., Arabia and the Gulf, From Traditional Society to Modern States (New
Jersey: Barnes and Noble Books, 1986), 91.
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less than 60% of its indigenous work force in agriculture.35 This was due to
government incentives and subsidies which actually provided incentive for
the indigenous population to remain in agriculture.
The government, it seems, although making efforts to reduce the
country's reliance on oil wealth, is reluctant to employ its indigenous work
force and bring this sector into its political realm. But rather, continue to
subsidize agriculture and maintain its heavily skewed economy toward the
primary sector. This is further evidenced by the fact that only 4.2% (1985) of
the work force is in manufacturing and the work force as a whole (24%) is still
involved in agriculture. At conservative estimates, foreigners comprised some
43% of the labor force in 1985. These facts taken together with the relatively
low skills and moderate health standards among the Saudi population just
serve to highlight the reliance of Saudi Arabia on oil revenues and the
poverty of real domestic labor resources. The maturity of the economy then
would seem to be a function of the ruling family maintaining stability. The
irony of this is that while maintaining this, that is, disallowing mobilization
in order to maintain tribal loyalty, it undermines the growth of an institu-
tional power base. It has been argued as well that tribal powers have been
replaced with regional governors, but that the royal family has managed to
systematically keep lines of authority within its grasp.
The political reality of Saudi Arabia is that all major decisions have been
and continue to be made by the senior princes of the royal family. The tribal
nature of Saudi Arabia's political structure and its lack of resemblance to any
known political model make analysis difficult. The implication is, however,
35Netton, 97.
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that any opinion outside of the ruling royal family's circle is illegal. This obvi-
ously shows a lack of any official channels for expressing dissident views
through any western style political process. The result of this is the formation
of underground opposition movements. None of these movements have had
any significant impact, but have gotten the attention of the royal family
because of their attractiveness as a manipulative tool for more radical neigh-
boring Arab states.
If these domestic opposition elements can find external support, they
have the potential to transform their ideas into a threat to the regime. These
elements have been suppressed, but could find potential in an outside actor
that wished to influence the Saudi regime. One vehicle for this type of influ-
ence is the expatriate worker.
A rapid increase in oil income of the oil producing nations of the Arab
peninsula has induced governments to launch ambitious development plans.
The speedy undertaking of various projects in the absence of a national
skilled labor force has compelled a number of countries to use expatriate
manpower on a massive scale. The benefits of the oil wealth have been
primarily geared toward, as expected, nationals. Foreign residents have in
many cases been denied citizenship or permanent residency even if they have
been established for decades. Along with these there are further costs to the
expatriate in civil rights, education, property and business ownership, and
other social welfares. Saudi Arabia, it would seem then, is caught in a
dilemma. The ruling family wants to maintain its power, and does so in
several ways. First, it helps to maintain and reinforce the tribal ties and rela-
tionships through regional governors. These governors have no real political
power, and the ruling family's political hold over them is strong. Second,
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through subsidies and incentives, the ruling family has encouraged the
indigenous population, at least to some degree, to remain out of the industrial
workforce, and in the agricultural sector. This, in turn, alleviates the need for
broad based education, and again in turn, if we follow the Gellner model, the
need for political participation. Third, the importation of the industrial work-
force, that is, the expatriate population, is kept from any political participa-
tion through rules set down by the royal family. The cost of maintaining this
power, however, it would seem, is approaching its limits.
C. THE DILEMMA FACING THE SAUDI REGIME
It might be concluded then that the evolution of Saudi Arabia from a
traditional to a modern society is far from maturity. The material successes
that have come with Saudi oil wealth have been impressive. The infrastruc-
tural developments in transportation, communication, and other areas have
been completed in a span of only a few decades. In the area of social develop-
ment, however, the Kingdom seems to have yet to take on mature structures.
With regard to the concept of rentier economies, one might conclude that
although the Saudi government continues to make efforts to diversify its
economy, prevailing behavior patterns will present an obstacle to this. If the
majority of the Saudi population remains distanced from the productive
sector of the economy, then no amount of capital infusion will produce an
economy capable of sustaining itself without continued oil rents.
The Saudi government has attempted to meet this problem of creating
an indigenous workforce through vocational schools and programs, however
45
these have been rejected by much of the Saudi youth.36 If the Saudi popula-
tion continues in its pattern characteristic of a rentier economy, that is, not
becoming involved in the workforce and in the development process, then one
might conclude that the state will soon become totally dependent on rents
and foreign labor.
Further, one might conclude that the continued influx of foreign workers
may actually be adding to the strength of tribal ties, and thus preventing this
population from becoming available for new modes of socialization. This con-
cept becomes even more difficult to achieve considering the concepts of
Saudi/Islamic work ethics, and the tendency of the population to hang on to
these traditional roots.
As the world passes from the oil era to the next, the dilemma for Saudi
Arabia becomes even more acute. Without a fundamental change in economic
and social orientation from a one resource economy to a more diversified one,
Saudi Arabia will remain at the mercy of a volatile international commodity
whose future prospects are not very stable. Yet in counteracting this instabil-
ity, the ruling family has virtually denied the social mobilization that the
indigenous population needs in order to build a self sustaining economy.
Despite the rapid modernization of Saudi Arabia, its rulers have managed to
avoid the social and political dislocation that accompany development and
industrialization. Unless changes are made in this arena, certainly any state
of maturation by western standards can not be achieved.
This, of course, begs the question as to whether or not the ruling family
wants to make these changes. Certainly what we are talking about here is the
36Stookey, 22.
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democratization of a monarchical regime, which may not be necessarily
desired by those in power. Another theory includes the actors of the interna-
tional community. The cooperation between producers and consumers is an
important one, and the intimate relationship between the United States and
Saudi Arabia can not be discounted as extremely influential in Saudi Arabia's
domestic policies, and the stability of Saudi Arabia is certainly of interest to
the United States.
The total dependence of Saudi Arabia and other OPEC member states
upon oil revenues simply postpones the day of reckoning. We must assume,
therefore, that foremost among the objectives among these states is the
diversification of their economies. Policies and objectives that might act as
solutions in the economic arena seem fairly identifiable. The more subtle and
complex issues remain, however, in the political arena.
As for social mobilization and its accompanying nationalism, it seems
regrettable that King Faisal's vision for his people has not been completely
realized. If, however, as some authors have predicted, the middle class
continues to grow, it would seem inevitable that the royal family will soon be
obliged to grant some sort of political participation to the growing class. The
reassessment of policy may be forced on the regime considering greater mobil-
ity of the middle class and a rise in education.
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V. POTENTIAL FOR REVOLUTION IN SAUDI ARABIA
This chapter will focus on the potential for revolution, or the unstable
prelude to revolution, in Saudi Arabia. In a broad context, this topic deserves
attention from a U.S. national security standpoint in that Saudi Arabia has
acted as a partner to the United States in many ways. Certainly, and most
recently, in the Persian Gulf War, Saudi Arabia was not only a staging and
launching area for U.S. military forces against Iraq, but also an important
ally in many other ways. Saudi Arabia continues to help stabilize oil prices,
and thus the economic effects that accompany these stable prices. Indeed,
Saudi Arabia is now the only large pro-western state in the Gulf. Saudi
Arabia is the only major Persian Gulf oil producer that is aligned with the
west. Its wealth and influence with OPEC have made Saudi Arabia the only
regional power that can offer an effective security effort to protect the more
moderate Gulf states. The importance of establishing and maintaining rela-
tions between the United States and moderate Gulf states becomes front page
news, it seems, only when the stability of this region is threatened. The chal-
lenge that faces the United States is maintaining this stability. American
military power and political power has traditionally provided a safeguard for
Saudi Arabia in its vulnerability to external regional threats. A growing
threat that this chapter will examine is of another nature, however, and that
threat is a revolutionary movement from within Saudi borders. External
threats will be included in this examination to the degree that they might act
as a catalyst for internal opposition activity.
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The assumption made in this chapter is that Saudi Arabia is the key
foreign policy tool for the U.S. in maintaining stability in the Persian Gulf
region. The hypothesis is that Saudi Arabia is growing increasingly vulnera-
ble to a destabilizing revolutionary movement that will prove to be a threat to
this stability and invite even greater potential for threat from regional actors.
To quickly summarize the forces at work in developing the aforemen-
tioned assumption and hypothesis and illuminate this chapter in the context
of the thesis, recall these points: 1) the concept of reserve to production ratio
and the potential for a monopoly of the world's oil held by the Middle East by
approximately 2020, 2) the concept that this monopoly will not just be on oil
as a resource for industrialized nations, but more importantly as a worldwide
economic market, and thus as a greater potential threat, 3) that policies thus
far instituted by the U.S. to meet the challenges that diminishing oil supplies
present have been directed at reducing import dependency, particularly from
the Middle East, which, although effective in one respect, have not addressed
the true nature of the threat, 4) that the impact of the oil industry on Saudi
Arabia has only acted to reinforce a regime which will inevitably be obligated
to accommodate its rising middle and working classes and forced to resolve its
problems with the conflict presented between the indigenous and expatriate
workforce.
In making an analysis for the potential for this destabilizing activity in
Saudi Arabia, it is helpful to first define revolution, and those who might act
as revolutionaries. Crane Brinton defines a revolution as a "drastic sudden
substitution of one group in charge of the ruling of a territorial political entity
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for another group by violent uprising."37 . Those who would be called revolu-
tionaries, as defined by Greene, seek a major alteration in the prevailing
distribution of wealth, status, and power.38 Techniques used by those revolu-
tionaries may range from terrorism through guerrilla warfare and general
strikes to a coup d'etat. Although these definitions are useful in this analysis,
what is of greater concern here are the factors that might lead to a revolution.
The process or means of the destabilizing activity leading up to a revolution,
rather than a revolution itself is the focus of this analysis. There are numer-
ous models and theories on revolution, their causes and outcomes. A theory or
model only becomes useful, however, if it can act as a predictor. Presumably,
if a particular nation exhibits those preconditions of revolution that fit a
model or theory, then one might predict or even prevent a revolution.
Certainly Saudi Arabia exhibits many of the characteristics found to be
preconditions of revolution shown in many theoretical models. This relatively
young nation has in a very compressed time period undergone a transforma-
tion from an isolated desert kingdom to a key position in the international
community, and there are those who contend that considering factors weigh-
ing against a successful and stable development that Saudi Arabia has done
very well, that the steadfast purpose of government and people of Saudi
Arabia, despite the inevitable social strain of change, are creating a modern
society which remains entirely consistent with the teachings of Islam.39 This
3
'Crane Brinton, Anatomy ofa Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), 4.
-'"Thomas H. Greene, Comparative Revolutionary Movements -Search for Theory and Justice
(New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1984),15.
39Fouad Al-Farsy, Saudi Arabia A Case Study in Development (London, New York: KPI, 1986),
213.
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view also comes to the defense of Saudi Arabia's system of government, claim-
ing that rather than the stereotypical western perception of an autocratic
monarch, that Saudi Arabia is based on a unique consensus basis. The Saudi
system of government, according to this view, is based on the Royal Family,
the consensual basis of the Ulama, and the tribal chieftains, all of which are
considered on important matters, and which act to allow for public
participation.
Opposing these views, however, are many theoretical models of revolu-
tion which point out for example, that the simple combination of a technologi-
cal and industrial revolution and the accompanying urbanization will give
rise to middle and working classes which will at some point require public
participation. Certainly Saudi Arabia is a unique case with regard to poten-
tial for revolution. With many complex variables, the first place to begin an
analysis is with basic demographics.
The population of Saudi Arabia is approximately 11.5 million people, 4
million of which are non Saudis. Most indigenous Arabs are Sunni Muslim
making the Arab population primarily homogenous. Of the Muslims in the
country, all are Sunni Muslims with the exception of less than 1 million
Shiite Muslims. The population of the country can be divided into three basic
categories. They are 1) major tribes of the country, 2) natives of the cities,
towns, and villages, and 3) the foreigners living and working in the country.
These three categories can be broken down further by corresponding regional
differences which are 1) the desert interior, 2) the cosmopolitan port cities
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and pilgrimage sites, and 3) the technological oil centers of the eastern
province.40
The Saudi political leadership is dominated by the house of Saud, or, the
Royal Family. It has been estimated that the Royal Family has in excess of
5000 members, but the major political decisions remain in the hands of
roughly 12 princes. Under one king there is no formal system of checks and
balances other than Islamic law, but rather than an absolute monarchy,
Saudi Arabia claims that the Royal Family serves as the political con-
stituency of the kingdom. The king is the head of the family and he acts as
both the chief of state and head of government. Saudi Arabian military forces
consist of approximately 67,000 personnel.
The essential focus is whether or not Saudi Arabia can maintain its sta-
bility. Instability arises when political, social, and economic institutions of a
country fail to meet society's expectations.41 In Saudi Arabia expectations are
rapidly rising. These rising expectations are partly the result of greater
education opportunities and mass communications which have propelled this
once isolated desert kingdom to the center of Middle Eastern and world poli-
tics. Another obvious influential factor in these rising expectations is the
massive oil revenues which have made yesterday's luxuries into today's
necessities in Saudi Arabia.





In the face of these expectations the strongest foundation upon which
Saudi stability rests is the society itself. Although changing, the Saudi family
remains a strong institution which provides identity, direction, and a social
sense of purpose. The extended family remains the core of society and it is
common to have several members of the extended family living together.42
The strong Islamic values held in Saudi society have provided a moral direc-
tion and a bulwark against other Middle Eastern countries lacking this qual-
ity as evidenced by the resurgent Islamic fundamentalism found in Iran for
example.
Another factor when examining the stabilizing forces of Saudi Arabia is
regime legitimacy. The Saudi regime holds two claims as a basis for legiti-
macy which have helped to maintain its stability. The first is that the regime
lays claim to the 200 years old Wahhabi movement. Secondly, Saudi Arabia
has never been directly governed by a colonial or occupying power. Together
these two factors combined with Saudi Arabia's status of wealth, give the
Saudi regime the self assurance in the arena of world politics that is often
lacking in third world countries.
Another contributing factor to the stability of the nation falls under
social services. Behind the military, education and health represent the
second and third largest budget allocations for Saudi Arabia. Saudi health
care services are better than any in the region with over 100 hospitals.
Although not compulsory, education is free to all Saudis. There are 14 univer-
sities; 7 for men and 7 for women, with upwards of 70% of the population
42MERI Report, 6.
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aged 5-19 enrolled in school.43 The rapid development of the infrastructure
has provided Saudis with many modern services and jobs in transportation
and communications.
B. DESTABILIZING FORCES
Juxtaposed to these stabilizing forces are of course the destabilizing
forces. An overview of some of the destabilizing events of recent Saudi history
help to organize an analysis. Certainly in some cases of the Royal Family, the
need for reform and the granting of some sort of public participation has been
recognized. However, few reforms have been implemented. Neither the sever-
ity of social and political tension nor any singular act of opposition to the
Royal Family has been cause enough to enact any significant reforms.44
In 1955 a coup was planned by army officers who were experiencing
delays in being paid. These officers, it has been suggested, were inspired by
both the Nasserite revolutionary model and by reports of the corrupt monar-
chical regime. Oil workers expressing similar sentiments went on strike in
1953 and 1955. Both the coup and the strikes were quickly quelled.
Similar feelings shared by others gave rise to secret societies and mili-
tary conspiratory cells. The National Reform Front of 1954, and the Free
Saudis of 1956 were examples of this frustration. Up through roughly 1958
the main sources of this discontent were western educated commoners and
others incited by the Nasserite model. In response to these uprisings the




Further instability was evident as a result of infighting in the Royal
Family. Attempts to exploit this situation were made by Egypt. Following
1958 up through their defeat in the Six Day War, Egypt sustained Saudi
opposition with activity designed to subvert the Saudi regime. Nor could
Saudi Arabia ignore revolutionary activity occurring in Yemen, Sudan, and
Libya in 1969. Iraq was soon to follow with the emergence of the Baath state
dedicated to the destruction of reactionary monarchies.
Further opposition organizations resulted in Saudi Arabia from both
internal and external tensions, and in June of 1969 an attempted coup was
thwarted. Again military officers were involved along with conspirators from
the PDRY. Saudi Arabia has not been immune to opposition activity, nor is it
today. Following is a summary of some of the contemporary potentially
destabilizing forces and opposition elements.
First is the Saud family itself. The propriety of the Saud Family rule is
by no means universally accepted in the country, and it is likely to appear
increasingly unacceptable to rising generations. Infighting among family
members has occurred, and in some cases rivalry among position holders in
various ministries has hindered smooth government. Factional debates occur
within the royal family with three basic groups making up these factions.
They are the western oriented faction, the pan-Arabists, and the religious
faction.45 One of the ruling family's claims of stability is, as discussed, Islam,
and the fact that the government operates within the confines of Islam adds
to security and stability of the system.
*5MERI Report, 19
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Islam is one of the political forces that can sometimes fall under the
heading of potential opposition activity, however, and this is found in the
trend of Islamic Fundamentalism. With the ousting of the Shah of Iran in
1979, the Ayatollah Khomeini ushered in a revitalizing fervor for what the
west calls Islamic fundamentalism. The basic concept advocates a return to
sources (the Koran) as a basis for daily life. It has an ideological following in
many Arab countries and much of the religious turmoil that has accompanied
it has in many cases become violent. The Hamah Massacre in Syria, the
assassination of Sadat in Egypt, and turbulence experienced in Iraq can all be
traced to the resurgent Islamic movement. Indeed Islam is a potentially
destabilizing force, and in many cases Islamic militancy has become a means
of expressing opposition to the regime. Certainly Saudi Arabia is not immune
to these forces. Saudi Arabia sees itself as having a particular responsibility
to the Islamic world as it is home to two of Islam's most holy places, Mecca
and Medina. Islam is more than a religion. It is a way of life, providing the
political ideology of the regime as well as the constitutional base for the legal
system. It may not be a large threat, but considering the fact that between
40% and 60% of oil workers in the eastern province are Shia Muslims, they
might be a likely candidate for recruitment from nearby Iran in this regard.
Also attractive to potential opposition forces is the notion that power or politi-
cal influence might be gained through control of the oil fields of the region.
There have been reports of pipeline sabotage and some reports of Shiite
unrest. Some of these reports could be the result of Iranian disinformation
campaigns aimed at destabilizing the Saudi government.
Saudi Arabia remains one of the few countries in the region in which the
military has not played a significant role in government. Surrounding
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monarchies of the region being overthrown by military dictatorships has
certainly gotten the attention of the Royal Family, however. Dissatisfied
military members, as previously discussed, have occasionally expressed their
frustrations, and coup attempts have been reported. Low pay and poor living
conditions relative to their civilian counterparts were and in some cases
continue to be sources of tension among military members. Beyond simple
repression, the Royal Family has essentially paid to guard against further
opposition. Military salaries were doubled in 1977 and the government has
continued to spend large amounts of money on military infrastructure and
equipment to insure loyalty.46 The Saud Family has also encouraged military
careers for many of the younger princes.
These are some of the reasons for ambivalence on the issue of military
build up. They have also served as a warning on the limits of military
expansion.
Yet another dilemma faced by the Royal family in the rapid industrial
development of Saudi Arabia is providing the workforce to enable this growth.
Initially, a lack of skilled and semi-skilled workers forced Saudi Arabia to
import labor to work in the oil fields. The resultant revenue generated has
allowed for mass industrialization and the employment opportunities to go
with it. The lack of skilled workers has resulted in the continued importation
of this workforce. The solution to this problem is presumably to begin build-
ing a skilled indigenous workforce through education. This, of course, falls
into the same dilemma in that this rising skilled workforce is the seedling for
46Anthony H. Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability (Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1984), 227.
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eventual motivation toward political participation. The alternative, which is
the expatriate workforce, presents its own problems. The constraints put
upon the expatriate workforce, has created social, religious, and ethnic
tensions.
Attempts at reform seem to have only compounded the problem. Greater
constraint on the expatriate workforce has only created greater frustration.
Most expatriates live in relative poverty compared to Saudis.47 Saudi Arabia
has the largest expatriate population in the Gulf, and the disparities in living
conditions and social services coupled with discrimination has only acted to
build further tension. Illegal immigration has been another result of the pres-
sure on expatriates. In discouraging further immigration of foreign workers,
Saudi Arabia has created a huge vacancy in employment.
In trying to fill this gap Saudi Arabia has implemented manpower and
training programs, but obstructing these efforts is a lack of interest in the
critically needed employment skills. A serious problem is the obsession on the
part of the Saudis with management careers. These careers are more lucra-
tive and offer better advancement, and have attracted the bulk of the edu-
cated male population. The result is an imbalance in manpower development
and bloated management sectors of industry.
We can presume that at some point, whatever factors the Saud monar-
chy claims as its basis for legitimacy, either religious, or the fact that it has
never been under colonial rule, or its great wealth, or a combination of these,
that sooner or later the regime in power will be obligated to make reforms to




faced with the King's Dilemma, so has the United States met with a similar
diametrical challenge. U.S. intervention has been intermittent in the region,
and while supporting other interests in the region such as Israel, the U.S. has
not built a strong trust with the Arab world. Strides made during the Persian
Gulf War certainly speak well for the relations of Saudi Arabia and the
United States and their mutual interests. Conversely, however, western
presence in the region has and continues to be greeted with skepticism and
distrust and U.S. presence is viewed by many Arabs as wanton imperialism.
Political pressure is another force at work here in that U.S. policy makers are
subject to criticism for their support of this monarchical and, as some might
contend, repressive regime.
Some analyses claim that western presence in the Middle East in any
large scale or overt way can actually place at risk those regimes it is attempt-
ing to protect.48 The very presence of U.S. military forces could and has
inspired violent action. A further illustration of the King's Dilemma, in this
sense being the burden of the United States as well as Saudi Arabia's, falls
under the heading of economic development. The United States has con-
tributed to numerous economic development programs in support of Saudi
Arabia. The urbanization and modern industrial changes resulting from these
projects have certainly acted to stimulate massive social changes. Traditional
social groupings are eroding and giving way to new groups with aspirations
for freer expression and political rights. These ideas are further nourished by
Saudi students returning from the United States, and by daily contact with
48Cunningham, 110.
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U.S. workers.49 Presumably it is less in U.S. interest to see reforms take place
through violent means. Clearly, western presence is a factor in the stability of
the Middle East and deserves attention in U.S. foreign policy decisions.
C. APPLYING THEORY
All of the aforementioned potentially destabilizing forces seem to in some
way fit into most theoretical models for revolution, and those destabilizing
forces which do not fit into generally accepted models, can be presumed to act
as only adding further to the forces of potential revolution. In most cases of
the destabilizing forces it seems that the Saud family has in some way either
repressed expression of frustration, or bought the loyalty of potential opposi-
tion. Indeed, the very development that has taken place has been used to deal
with local unrest. Development projects have been used to essentially funnel
dollars to tribal and village leaders.50
The purchase of loyalty can not last forever. Even the great wealth of
Saudi Arabia and its very high per capita income can not withstand the pres-
sures of social mobilization much longer. Even if the regime was able to
repress opposition activity through equitable distribution of the kingdom's
wealth, it could not do so indefinitely, and it could not deal with many of the
previously mentioned forces of opposition in this manner. The expatriate
worker situation or the forces of Islamic fundamentalism for example, are
much more difficult forces to repress.
4"James H. Noyes, The Clouded Lens Persian GulfSecurity and U.S. Policy (Stanford, California:
Hoover Institution Press, 1982), 104.
50Cordesman, 229.
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If, however, reforms are not enacted quickly enough, and the Royal
Family continues to use its wealth as a repressor, then one might turn to a
theoretical approach for an alternative. According to Huntington, three possi-
ble strategies are available to the monarch. He, or in this case, the Saud
Royal Family, could attempt to reduce the role of the monarchical authority
and make efforts toward a constitutional monarchy in which people, parties,
or a parliament would have authority. A second option could be a combination
of monarchical and popular authority, and finally, the monarchy could be
maintained and efforts made to minimize the disruptive effects of a broaden-
ing political consciousness. 51
These options, however, do not, as Huntington explains, apply to 20th
century monarchies. The success of the 20th century modernizing monarch,
according to Huntington, is measured by the size of his police force. The
inevitable conclusion that is reached is that the combination of reform and
repression means the centralization of power, and the centralization of power
means a failure to expand to accommodate political parties, and the end
result is revolution. Thus if this theory is followed and the assumption is
made that revolution is unavoidable, then three possibilities exist. The first is
a coup d'etat in which the ruling monarchy would become an oligarchy. The
second is a coup which would dispose of the monarch and the monarchy, but
fail to produce an institution of legitimacy, which would result in a praetorian
condition, and the third possible event would be a full scale revolution to a
modern party dictatorship.
51Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and London: Yah
University Press, 1968), 177.
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If one assumes this model to be an indicator of what may actually
happen in Saudi Arabia, then the conditions that currently exist in Saudi
Arabia might be an indicator as to which of these possibilities might occur.
Internal opposition in Saudi Arabia has yet to mobilize in any significant
manner. Although all of the elements of revolution are present in Saudi
Arabia according to most generally accepted models, Saudi Arabia has man-
aged to avoid major insurrections. It might follow that an outside actor could
be required to generate an amount of opposition activity large enough to over-
throw the government. Huntington points out that a revolution is not likely
without foreign intervention.52 It might also follow that if, in fact, there are
frustrated sectors of society in Saudi Arabia who are unable to mobilize, or
lack organized champions to act on behalf of group liberation, then this may
be the perfect spawning ground for terrorist activity.53 Furthermore, the
terrorist relies on the idea that by provoking a righteous wrath, he will
achieve the results of official overreaction. He must, therefore, commit an act
which will achieve the greatest publicity.
Thus, by combining these concepts, the following conclusions can be
drawn. First, one of three types of revolution will occur in Saudi Arabia.
Second, because Saudi Arabia has been able to repress opposition activity,
terrorism is a likely outcome as an attempt to inspire mobilization. Third,
also because of Saudi Arabia's ability to repress opposition activity, it is likely
that opposition activity will come from an external source. This is not to say
52Huntington, 305.
53Richard E. Rubenstein, Alchemists of Revolution Terrorism in the Modern World (New York:
Basic Books Inc. ),4.
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that an outright invasion will not occur, as might have been the case with
Iraq. Rather, what is being established here is how internal opposition activ-
ity might be inspired and organized. Finally, it has been established that
Saudi Arabia, as holder of the world's largest share of petroleum reserves,
and thus the power to control the world market, it is an attractive target for
individuals or groups wishing to share in this power or wealth, and certainly
an attractive target for insurrection or terrorist activity.
The challenges before the Saud regime are formidable. Political evolution
in Saudi Arabia, although unique, has been slow, and relative to modern
structures of government, negligible. Continued liaison with families, reli-
gious leaders, and technocrats by the ruling group has given Saudi Arabia a
unique means of achieving a limited political consensus. And as keeper of the
holy places of Islam, close underwriting from the United States, and a grow-
ing internal defense force, Saudi Arabia has maintained some degree of
immunity from dangerous internal and external pressures.
The traditional channels for consensus are eroding, however. Family and
tribal groups are giving way to new groups. Students returning from abroad
have new ideas and rising expectations. The indigenous and expatriate work-
force are both under increasing strain. Saudi society is becoming increasingly
divided and this division is reflected in the ruling family. All of these factors
together seem to present the conditions which might lead to revolt, but in
addition to these, Saudi Arabia is also subject to the pressures if Islamic
fundamentalism from a formidable force in Iran. Its great oil wealth makes
Saudi Arabia a vulnerable target for opposition activity, and as oil supplies
around the world diminish and Saudi Arabia gains a greater monopoly over
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the world's remaining oil, it will only increase in its vulnerability and attrac-
tiveness to opposition activity.
For the survival of the regime there is no alternative. Reform must take
place to preclude revolution. New social groupings and classes must be assim-
ilated and ultimately granted participation in the political process. If they are
not, then the conclusion drawn here is that the worst case revolutionary
scenario will take place, and that will be an outside force financing and




The age of oil will be a relatively short one. Much of the planet's
petroleum resources will likely be depleted within a century. Even with the
unpredictable ebb and flow of oil, it is inevitable that the increased scarcity of
this resource will produce an increase for its demand. Disturbances in the
relatively stable and natural laws of supply and demand (barring unforeseen
interruptions) for oil, however, have proven to be of an increasingly grave
nature to world stability. This thesis attempts to illustrate this gravity by
first examining specifically how much oil is consumed by the industrialized
nations of the world. This leads logically to the requirement for us to under-
stand how much oil remains on the planet, where it is located, who controls it,
and, of course, who controls the price of it. Simple math suggests that the
planet's oil supply will be depleted within 70 years. This figure is actually
conservative considering the fact that it includes oil that has not yet been
discovered and will surely cost much more to extract and refine than oil
produced at current production facilities. An important and subtle factor that
is revealed in an analysis of the world's remaining oil is the concept of reserve
to production ratios. Reserve to production ratios on a global scale suggest
that within approximately 30 years countries of the Middle East will hold a
monopoly of the world's remaining reserves. This monopoly will not occur
overnight either. Over the course of the next 30 years it will become increas-
ingly apparent that as reserves from countries other than the Middle East
diminish and become increasingly costly to extract, the Middle East's grasp
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over the remaining reserves will be reinforced and Middle East oil will be in
increasingly greater demand.
An analysis of the world's oil reveals yet another critical link between
this resource and world stability and that is the transnational oil market. Not
only has oil fueled the industrial revolution and continues to be an essential
feature of every industrialized nation's infrastructure, but also in the past
three decades it has emerged as a worldwide economic commodity. Oil has
made a transition from the term market to the spot market in which the price
per barrel of oil is now a single world wide price which fluctuates daily and
can greatly impact world economic trends. Combining these two concepts,
monopoly control of the world's remaining reserves and the commodity price
structure of the oil market suggests that those Middle Eastern countries with
the most oil will also have sharply increasing price control power and thus
power over potentially drastic global economic fluctuations. More than any
other Gulf state, Saudi Arabia must coordinate oil production and pricing
policies. This is because the range of Saudi oil production is so large that
swings in the production level have an impact on international oil prices.
An analysis of the United States' national energy strategy shows that
the aforementioned issues have not been addressed. The next generation of
Americans will face the end of an era that has propelled the industrialized
nations through modern history. The magnitude of the changes that will have
to take place in the world's transition from oil to another energy source will
be on the order of magnitude of the entire industrial revolution itself. Every
automobile, every truck, every train, every ship, every airplane, indeed, every
infrastructure of every industrialized nation on the earth runs on some
derivative of oil. Conservation, alternative energy technologies, the Strategic
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Petroleum Reserve, and new oil exploration simply have not even begun to
make a hint of progress relative to the size of the challenge. There is no
doubt, as the cliche goes, that necessity will be the mother of invention, that
ingenuity, technology, and capital will answer to the call of necessity, and
when the oil is gone, there will be another source or sources of energy. Until
the oil is gone, however, simple economic laws tell us that while oil is still the
most cost effective way to fuel the industrialized nations, it will continue to be
consumed until there is none left. Until this eventuality is upon us, however,
the more contemporary issues of oil will dictate the direction of U.S. policy.
The national energy strategy of the mid 1970's was successful given its origi-
nal intention. The United States was able to reduce its dependency on foreign
oil, particularly on Middle Eastern oil, significantly. Since the Arab oil
embargo, the United has managed to reduce its imports from the Middle East
to less than 10% of its total consumption. However, this strategy of depen-
dency reduction does not address the issue of oil as a worldwide economic
commodity. It has become clear that the control of this world market and the
power that goes with it has resulted in an unforeseen national security chal-
lenge. In response to this challenge, the United States has correctly fostered a
strong relationship with Saudi Arabia, the world's largest oil producer, and
potentially soon to be largest shareholder of a four country oil monopoly in
the Middle East. Saudi Arabia has been able to stabilize the volatile price of
oil through increasing or decreasing production, thus the supply, and thus the
demand for oil. As a pro-western country and key member of OPEC and
OAPEC, Saudi Arabia has been able to influence many of the GCC oil
producers in continuing price control efforts toward stable world prices. It
would appear that Saudi Arabia, in its role as Middle East oil price stabilizer,
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that it not only is acting in the best interest of the United States, but may in
fact be the key vehicle for the United States in maintaining stability of the
world market. The issue that comes into question is by what means does the
United States maintain this relationship with Saudi Arabia and what threats
to this stability might exist.
In an examination of Saudi Arabia this thesis illustrates that the impact
of the oil industry on Saudi Arabia has given rise to disparities in Saudi
society both economically and politically. Saudi Arabia has been shown to be
nearly a classic case of the rentier concept. The Saudi Royal Family realizes
this trend, and also realizes that it is in their best interests as well to main-
tain stable oil prices. The dilemma that the Royal Family is faced with, how-
ever, is that with industrialization comes social changes. It is these social
changes that present the greatest challenge to Saudi stability. And finally in
chapter 4, this potential for instability is examined.
As Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Middle East draws increasingly
closer to holding a monopoly over the world's oil, it's attractiveness to poten-
tially destabilizing actors also increases. Individuals or nations seeking
wealth or power will now have a much greater opportunity to do so in Saudi
Arabia. Saudi Arabia contains within its borders all of the elements necessary
for revolution. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia is surrounded by regional actors
who may and have sought to influence one or more of these elements for their
own gain. These regional actors remain the greatest threat to Saudi stability,
but it is with the combined effects of internal opposition and Saudi Arabia's
attractiveness as holder of world economic power that will finally bring this
instability to the surface.
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Thankfully, the Persian Gulf War was short lived. But because of its
brief mark on history, it has also faded from our memories quickly. If it is for-
gotten too soon, indeed one might not recall that it was the first war of the
last decade of the 20th century. It was also the first play for power in the post
cold war world in which Iraq made its daring attempt to break out and
become a regional superpower. It was the first war in this century that an
Arab has invaded an Arab. And the Persian Gulf War was the first war for
the United States since Viet Nam.
When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, he controlled 19% of the world's
oil. If he had been able to continue through to Saudi Arabia, he would have
been in control of another 25 % of the world's oil. This thesis has attempted to
show that the kind of power associated with the control of this much oil is
now a far cry from its value as a resource alone. The economic leverage asso-
ciated with this control is now world wide. Furthermore, this economic power
will increase at an alarming rate as oil supplies around the world diminish,
become more difficult to produce, and thus more expensive, and the Middle
East remains as the only supplier of relatively inexpensive oil.
One must not forget either that the large majority of the coalition mili-
tary effort to suppress Saddam Hussein came from within the borders of
Saudi Arabia. The pre-positioning, staging, and launching of the huge U.S.
military effort from Saudi Arabia was critical to a U.S. victory, to make no
mention of the logistical and command and control support from behind
friendly Saudi lines. And now the United States is undergoing its largest mil-
itary drawdown and force reduction since World War II.
U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf in the oil era has been ram-
pant with controversy and contradiction. Factors influencing this presence
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have traditionally rested on four U.S. interests in the region and they were 1)
continued access to gulf oil, 2) containment of Soviet expansion, 3) pursuit of
peace in the Middle East, and 4) continued existence of the state of Israel. In
pursuing these goals through military means, some would contend that the
U.S. has actually acted to undermine its own interests.54 Arab faith in U.S.
support has been hindered by the continued support of Israel. The idea of
U.S. forces stationed in the region has traditionally been greeted with
distrust from the Arabs in that they might actually act as a focal point for
unrest and a target for revolutionary forces. Intervention in the Iran Iraq war
by the U.S., according to one source, may have only acted to endanger the
states it sought to protect.55 Some would contend that for the United States to
maintain stability in the region, that a greater sensitivity to the complex
regional issues is in order and that an over-the-horizon deterrent posture
would best represent U.S. military presence. The Persian Gulf War in many
ways represented a sharp contrast to this idea. Although U.S. presence in
Saudi Arabia represented great strides in their mutual interests, some would
contend that in order to preserve the gains made in this mutual effort, that
the U.S. should now withdraw and continue to underwrite Gulf security from
a distance.
President George Bush stated at the outset of the Persian GulfWar that
one of the four Guiding principles of U.S. policy was to maintain the stability
of Saudi Arabia. It has become clear that there is now a new addition to the




prices through relations with Saudi Arabia. The question becomes whether or
not this new goal can be achieved through military intervention, or through
diplomacy, or through some combination. Certainly the Persian Gulf War
demonstrated that direct intervention, and much more than support of a GCC
security force, was needed to defeat Iraq. Conversely, continued forward U.S.
military presence could put at risk the very regimes it is attempting to
protect. Furthermore, if the U.S. were to support future arms sales to Saudi
Arabia and the moderate GCC states in building up an indigenous Gulf secu-
rity force, it may help to fuel the possibility of a coup in Saudi Arabia. So
threats to Saudi stability could come from both external regional actors or
from within Saudi borders, or a combination of the two.
If a coup were to take place in Saudi Arabia, be it from a military sector
or otherwise, certainly oil prices would soar, at least temporarily. Eventually,
however, the laws of supply and demand would proceed naturally, and what-
ever group ended up in control would soon realize that oil must be sold, and if
those in control have a sense for the long term vision, they will realize that it
is in their best interests to keep oil prices moderate and stable. The United
States would at some point embrace the new regime to the mutual benefit of
both countries.
The next possible scenario, were a revolution to occur, would be a
belligerent force or person (internal) whose lack of long term vision could
potentially keep oil prices high for an extended period, and require some sort
if U.S. intervention. If military intervention was required, it would not be
required to be on a large scale, but it would certainly meet with anti western
sentiments, and could potentially be protracted indefinitely because of this.
With a strategic petroleum reserve of roughly two months supply, the U.S.
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would have no choice but to intervene if stability was not in sight. The result-
ing relations with Saudi Arabia and likely most Arab nations would be
severely damaged, and probably require enormous efforts to restore, and the
cost of keeping in place some sort of interim government would likely also
prove costly to the U.S.
The next scenario would involve invasion from a regional actor. This is
the scenario experienced in the Persian Gulf War. The Saudis welcomed U.S.
presence, at least temporarily. U.S. support of the Saudi regime and percep-
tions of western commitment to the Arabs boded well for U.S.-Saudi relations.
On the negative side, however, a large U.S. force was required to quell Iraqi
forces, and without Saudi support the Iraqi defeat might have proven much
more difficult from a tactical and logistical standpoint.
The last scenario would be a revolution in Saudi Arabia inspired and
supported by a regional threat. If this regional actor was able to co-opt
enough indigenous support, and had a plausible military force, this would
prove to be the worst case for the United States. Not only would military
intervention be required, but depending upon popular Saudi sentiment
toward the opposition movement, U.S. presence would likely be unwelcome.
Further, if the outside actor were heavily armed, Iran for example, the U.S.
forces required to meet it would have to be formidable. Assuming the new
revolutionary regime were neither pro-western nor interested in stable oil
prices, the potential for a protracted conflict is high.
Certainly sensitivity, on the part of the United States to the inner work-
ings of the Arab world needs to be raised if continued stable relations are to
be achieved. Anti western sentiment among Arab countries is easily incited,
and the U.S. has in many cases not acted in its own best interests in gaining
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Arab confidence. Indeed western presence in the Persian Gulf, perceived in
the west as stabilizing and peace keeping forces, has been perceived by the
Arab world as imperialistic, and reminiscent of colonial rule.
A disregard or lack of understanding of the Arab world will certainly not
help the United States in peacefully achieving its goal of continued access to
Gulf oil. And in the event of a threat, either external or internal, the U.S. will
only make for more ease of intervention if it is also armed with knowledge of
Arab concerns and sensitivity to western presence. Conversely, while this
overtly "hands off' underwriting of Gulf security may ease Saudi-U.S. rela-
tions and actually allow for greater stability of the region, it is also impera-
tive that the U.S. be prepared to meet the worst case scenario.
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